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ABSTRACT
AN ANALYSIS OF FACTORS AFFECTING BID OF INFANT-FORMULA
MANUFACTURERS IN WIC REBATE AUCTIONS
RAYMOND OPOKU
2017
This thesis investigates the factors that affect bid decisions of infant-formula
manufacturers in WIC rebates auctions. Since its inception in 1972, the WIC program has
served more than half of participating women and their infants each year. Today, Infant
formula - the most expensive food item on the WIC menu - is accessible to all participants
for free through the WIC rebate program. Through the rebate program, firms submit bids
to solely supply their infant formula to a state WIC agency at a discount leading to fall in
net prices. Yet, the firms in the infant formula market are selective in the auctions they
submit bids for. This study investigated the factors that influence firm’s decisions to bid
as such the role of state demographics and market share in such decisions using cross
sectional data spanning from 1986 to 2016 for analysis. The major findings of research
include state alliance membership and firm’s market share are a primary factor when it
comes to bidding decisions.

Key words: WIC, Rebate Auctions, Infant formula, Alliances, market share, Sole source,
Net prices, Wholesale Price
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CHAPTER ONE (1)
1.0 INTRODUCTION
Administered nationwide through local offices, the US Department of Agriculture’s
(USDA) Special Supplementary Nutritional Program for Women, Infants and Children
(WIC) is a federal government funded health and nutrition initiative for lower income to
medium level-income women who may be pregnant, lactating or in postpartum, babies
and/or kids mostly under five, who are at nutritional risk (NWA, 2011). It is the third
largest federal intervention program after the Supplementary Nutritional Assistance
Program (SNAP) and School Lunch program (Oliviera and Frazao,2009; Currie, 2003).
The program is structured such that participants receive vouchers to have access to
nutritional foods enlisted on the WIC menu of foods. The program offers educational
information on the essentials of breastfeeding and its alternatives, health and nutritional
support to its members.
Among the federal government’s most successful and cost-efficient intervention
programs, WIC did not start until the 1960’s. At the time, low-income American families
were falling short on the daily nutritional requirement and this drew concerns from both
t1he federal government and the public. In September 1972, a two-year WIC pilot was
begun (Ghefi, Olmested, Racine & Oliviera, 2002). The program was not in full flight
until 1974 (USDA, 1999).
According to the Centre for Budget Policy and Priority the eligibility for the
program is determined by incomes usually at or beneath the 185% poverty level set by
the federal government level plus nutritional risk in at least one of the following
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categories: 1) abnormal nutritional conditions (such as anaemia or underweight)
detectable by anthropometric measurement (measurements of height and blood test for
anaemia); 2) conditions that predispose towards inadequate nutritional intake; 3)
nutritional medical conditions such as diabetes; 4) dietary deficiencies endangering health
(Abrams, 1993).
The WIC program does not only cater for the need of breastfeeding mothers but
also non-lactating mothers. Infant formula has become the highest priced food item on
the WIC menu and as such is made available at a reduced price to WIC members. Though
the program has enjoyed enormous praise for its effectiveness and efficiency in the
improvement of the health of women and children nationwide, it has come under criticism
for its most popular component - infant formula. Scholars have argued that the free
provision of infant formula has been the cause of the low breastfeeding rates among WIC
mothers (Davis, 2011).
1.1 BACKGROUND
WIC which currently aids over 8 million women who are pregnant, or lactating mothers
and young children under five, began over 40 years ago as a pilot program according to
Review of WIC Food Packages in 2016. The program saw its implementation in 1972
and has grown ever since (Betson, 2007). It currently serves more than half of the infants
and more pregnant women in the US (Betson, 2007). In 2016, the WIC had an annual
budget of about $6.6 billion.
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WIC is the United States’ attempt to reach the nation-wide nutritional policy target
for majority of Americans; it is a support program aimed at providing the nutritional
support to lower income to medium level-income women who may be pregnant, lactating
or in postpartum, babies and/or kids mostly under five, who are at nutritional risk (Davis
& Oliviera, 2015), (NWA, 2011).
The WIC program provides foods including milk, cereal, cheese, eggs, fruit juice,
peanut butter and infant formula, among other foods. The program encourages and
endorses breast-feeding as the best nutritional source for infants (Davis & Oliviera, 2015).
Among the nutritional foods provided by the WIC program, infant formula remains the
most expensive food item. According to Davis (2009), government agencies are the
largest purchasers of the product. The United State Department of Agriculture (USDA)
estimated that WIC procures about 57% to 68% of infant formula (Oliviera et al. 2010).
In the past, the cost of infant formula placed a constraint on the annual congressional
appropriations received by the program, making it difficult to serve all participants. In
view of the high cost of infant formula, WIC state agencies are mandated by law to run a
cost-containment scheme for buying of infant formula (Davis & Oliviera, 2015) after its
initiation and success in the states of Tennessee and Oregon.
The cost-containment system is an auction-based process, where infant formula
manufacturers compete through a sealed bid auction by offering rebates to become the
WIC state agency’s sole supplier (Davis,2008). They receive the exclusive market rights
to sell their product to the state WIC participants in return for giving the state a per-can
rebate on infant formula sold through the program (Davis, 2008).
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The higher the rebate offered, the lower the net price of the infant formula is. The
firm with the lowest net price offer wins the sole-source contract.

According to Carlson et. al. (2015), the WIC rebate process has been costeffective, and its competitive bidding process for purchasing infant formula is essential
to its efficiency (Carlson et. al, 2015). The authors estimated that since the introduction
of the WIC rebate program, WIC has been generating $1.5 billion to $2 billion annually
in savings and with its annual federal appropriations serves 2 million more participants.
Without its cost containment system, WIC would have required more funding
support from other sources to serve as many participants, or would run the risk of serving
a smaller number of participants thereby hindering the achievement of nutritional goal.
(Carlson et. al, 2015).
Initially, infant-formula producers did not forcefully compete for WIC rebate
contracts. Davis and Oliveira (2015) assessed various infant formula manufacturers bids
for different State agency contracts granted from 2003 to 2013 and found that only three
infant formula producers bid on rebate contracts throughout the period. As such
manufacturers bid submission varied differently across the various contracts. The nature
of this market makes it oligopolistic such that a few firms exist in a market with a large
demand. There has been a huge gap between the real winning net price bid and the next
closest competitor. Davis and Oliviera (2015) further suggested that infant formula
producers forcefully competed during WIC auctions. The increase in these rebates
recently was attributed to contracts receiving numerous bids, as well as an increase in
contracts turn-over among manufacturers (Davis and Oliveira, 2015).
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1.2 STATEMENT OF PROBLEM
Although bidding is entirely voluntary, infant formula manufacturers routinely
compete aggressively on WIC contracts and offer substantial rebates. According to the
Centre on Budget and Policies priorities, $1.5 billion to $2 billion annual revenue rebate
is generated from the nationwide competitive bidding. As a result, WIC’s cost is
decreased considerably to the federal government in comparison to full retail value
incurred by non-WIC members (CBPP, 2017).
In 2006, the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) report confirmed that a spillover influence by which the contract WIC brand becomes the favourite of both non-WIC
customers and WIC customers could be a motivation to secure the WIC contract
regardless of whether manufactures make losses selling to WIC. The GAO report in 2016
further mentioned that the major infant formula producers agree to the importance of shelf
space and product placement in marketing strategies. Many WIC agency directors who
responded to a survey mentioned that they strongly agreed with the shelf space findings
and that it was an essential factor when firm submitted bids (GAO, 2006).
Under WIC’s competitive bidding scheme, infant formula producers offer
discounts- rebates to various state WIC programs in hopes to be chosen as that state’s
sole infant formula supplier to all WIC members in the state (Carlson, Greenstien &
Neuberger, 2017). Winning the WIC contract secures a manufacturer’s brand as the most
readily available brand which receives favourable shelf space in stores. When a producer
wins a state’s WIC contract, non-WIC participants purchase more of that producer’s
infant formula compared to their WIC counterparts (Huang and Perloff, 2007).
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Davis (2009) found that, out of several auctions available at any given time, infant
formula manufacturing firms do not all submit bids for these auctions. Firms are selective
in the auctions in which they participate to maximizing their chances by strategically
choosing the most promising ones. From Table 1.1 below it is observed that, with 172
representing the number of auctions, Ross leads the chart with the highest number of
submitted bids (166). Mead Johnson comes in second with 158 followed by Wyeth with
a total of 79 and Carnation with 42. This inspires an interesting question as to why firms
act this way in a purely oligopolistic market. This thesis seeks to examine factors
influencing infant formula manufacturers’ decisions to bid in WIC rebate auctions and
why firms aggressively contend for WIC contracts.
Table 1. 1 Wholesale and Rebate Distribution of Firms in 2019

Source:(Davis, 2009). All variables mean in dollars except Birth and WIC infants which
are in thousands.
In Table 1.1, it is observed that the means for rebates and wholesale prices in constant
2007 dollars. Interestingly wholesale prices are almost the same for the largest firms, Ross
and Mead Johnson as well as Carnation and Wyeth.
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Economically important auctions are not isolated. Just as the "general
equilibrium" tradition in economic theory has highlighted interrelations across markets
in the economy, auctions take place in a larger context. Single, isolated auctions are easier
to analyse. Rothkopf & Harstad (1994) suggested that models of isolated auctions may
serve as useful building blocks, but the isolation can obscure important impacts.
According to Rothkopf & Harstad, (1994), behaviours in auctions normally tend to be
changed by the context of those auctions. The authors further stipulate that outcomes of
such competitive bidding are affected by various economic relationships mainly alien to
the market (Rothkopf & Harstad, 1994).
Bidding decisions can be complex and time consuming process and involve the
utilization of a company´s resources. They also generate expenses that can be damaging
for other company business areas (Buzby, 2002; Cova, Salle, & Vincent, 2000).
On the other hand, decisions to bid or not to bid or the overall engagement in the
tender process can be based on subjective evaluation and decision making (Ahmad,
1990). To avoid situations where too many resources are used or where decision making
is based only on a gut feeling, a pre-bid screening and analysis procedures can become a
strategic tool (Cova et al., 2000). Garrett (2005) points out that an effective bidding
decision making process is important to manufacturers for cost reduction and revenue
generating reasons.
Most of the research done on bidding decisions and the factors influencing the
decisions concern the construction industry and huge contracts (Bagies & Fortune, 2006;
Stark & Rothkopf, 1979). Nonetheless, effective bidding cannot be over emphasised in
every industry as bad bids do affects firms’ resources.
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The preceding works have identified factors important in the bidding decisions,
however with large projects there is the need for highly secured financial power and
minimal risk (Bagies & Fortune, 2006). For a manufacturing company the factors can
differ as the number of tenders gets higher, the tenders get smaller and as such the
relationship with the customer can influence the long-term decision making.

Responding to all possible tender requests takes time and overloads the team
working with tenders in several states. This may affect the quality of all bids and decrease
the overall win rate of bids. The amount of effort put into the specification and estimation
process can differ according to the customer request. The firm can choose to concentrate
more efforts on larger in terms of volume, more profitable tenders (i.e. profit margin) and
prepare a quick estimate with high margins for other tenders where later negotiations with
the customer are expected (B. G. Kingsman, Hendry, L., Mercer, A., & de Souza, A.,
1996). However, the main goal of a manufacturing firm would be to concentrate efforts
on bids that would be successful in the end and bring in customer orders and generate
profit. As a part of the bid/no bid decision making the company could evaluate tenders
according to the critical factors and identify auctions that are more likely to be successful.
Therefore, the second objective of this study is to identify which factors are likely to
predict the success of a bid in WIC industry in the USA. Based on this, the research
question of thesis is:

What factors influence the entry decisions of a bid of an infant-formula manufacturer in
the WIC rebate auctions in the USA?
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1. 3 GENERAL OBJECTIVES.
The main objective of this study is to examine the factors influencing the bid decisions
of infant formula manufacturers in WIC rebate auctions.
1.4 SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES
Specifically, the study attempted:
•

to examine the factors influencing rebate bid decision-making by infant formula
manufacturers.

•

to identify the relationship between a firm’s share of WIC market and a bid decision.
1.5 STATEMENT OF HYPOTHESES
The main objective of the study is to examine factors responsible for firms’ decision to
bid in rebate auctions. Considering reviewed literature and the theoretical underpinnings;
the following were the hypotheses were tested;
𝐻0 : There is no relationship between firm market share and bid decisions.
𝐻0 : There is no relationship between State Alliance and biding decisions.
1.6 SIGNIFICANCE OF STUDY
This study should inform policymakers and practitioners in WIC markets on how best to
operate infant formula contract auctions. Given the characteristics of the population
represented in this study, results from this study can be generalized to other low income
countries’ populations, where applicable.
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1.7 SCOPE OF THE STUDY
The purpose of this research is to identify factors influencing rebate decision making
by infant formula manufacturers in the U.S. A logistic regression model was used to
establish the empirical relationship between bid decisions and market share. Other control
variables believed to influence bid decisions were considered to infer the importance of
profit in a firm’s behaviour.
The source of data is secondary and cross-sectional time series (Panel Data) which
was obtained from a compilation of losing and winning rebate bids from 1986 to 2016
for thirteen-ounce cans of milk-based liquid concentrate (Davis, 2016). The data already
have baseline demographic information about the WIC participants from all 50 states and
D.C.
1.8 ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
This study has been divided into five chapters. Chapter one considers an
introduction of this research with background of the study, problem statement, objectives
of study, significance of the study, and statement of hypotheses and scope of research.
Chapter two reviews both the theoretical and empirical literature available for the study.
The literature review examines related articles to provide information in relation to this
study to look for a better approach to this research. Chapter three discusses the
methodology, and issues relating to analysis of data for the study. Chapter four specifies
the model, analysis and presentation of empirical results. Finally, chapter five deals with
the conclusions, policy implications, limitations of the study and directions for further
research.
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CHAPTER TWO (2)
REVIEW OF LITERATURE

2. 0 HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE.
Three years prior to the establishment of WIC in 1972, the United States
Department of Health, Education and Welfare and the United States Department of
Agriculture received reports of various ailments among young women, breastfeeding
mothers, their infants and particularly pregnant women across the country who visited the
hospital due to malnutrition, and the lack of food. These findings were alarming. In 1969,
a recommendation from the White House Conference on Food, Nutrition and Health
prompted the government to take the nutritional needs of low-income pregnant and
lactating mothers as well as their infants and children seriously (White House Conference
on Food, Nutrition, and Health, 1970).
WIC established officially in 1972 by a congressional legislation (P. L. 92-433, was
sponsored by the Senator Hubert Humphrey (D) of Minnesota) as a preliminary two-year
pilot program. By the end of 1975, the program operated in 45 states expanding eligibility
to include non-lactating women who were up to 6 months postpartum as well as children
up to 5 years of age. It is currently the third largest federal food intervention initiative
after Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) or Food Stamps and The
School Lunch program.
WIC foods are marketed through various retail outlets across the US where
participants obtain food vouchers redeemable at state authorized retail stores.
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The voucher system insulates them from the normal cost considerations, when buying
nutritional supplementary items. According to Davis (2012), the Federal mandate
demands quantities allowable which are written on food vouchers. The states reimburse
all the retail stores for every food sold to WIC members based on their redeemable
vouchers (Davis, 2012).
WIC only provides specific food types to low income mothers and their young
who may be lacking this food nutrition from their diets. WIC provides foods including
whole-grain bread, infant formula, fruits and vegetables. Every now and then the USDA
revises the WIC food list. According to Centre of Budget and Policy Priorities (2007),
over 47,000 grocery stores nationwide received approval to accept WIC food vouchers
based on their prices and the variety of foods offered (Centre of Budget and Policy
Priorities, 2017) (Carlson, Greenstien & Neuberger, 2017).
In their address in 2015, Carlson and Neuberger provided an overview of the
efficiency of the WIC program stating that WIC was cost-effective, and its competitive
bidding process for purchasing infant formula was essential to its efficiency. Currently,
federal regulations are specific on what WIC State agencies needed to operate a costcontainment system for infant formula. They are required to make use a single-supplier
competitive system unless an alternative system provides equal or greater savings (7 CFR
246.16a).
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2.1 PRISONER’S DILEMMA PROBLEM
Betson (2007) argued that for infant formula suppliers, the rebate program has
eroded an immense amount of profitability from the market. Before the sole source
contract system was implemented, manufacturers enjoyed increasing revenues because
infant formula prices kept increasing and input cost stayed the same. In its initial roll out,
Betson (2007) identified that the government paid for consumer’s preferences of all WIC
participants. The rebate initiative marked an end to this relationship as government
demanded discounts for all their purchases (Betson,2007).
The producers certainly were not happy with such an arrangement and fought the
rebate system. Davis (2011) questioned what manufactures would do having been faced
with in this sole source contract. Refusing to bid was their option which was not viable
unless demand from WIC mothers was unmet. (Davis, 2011)
All firms could not enter into a binding cooperative agreement not to bid due to
federal legislation so that the government is forced to abandon the program all together.
In the absence this consensus, each manufacturer had a short-term incentive of greatly
profiting from each bid they submitted. This was where Wyeth (an infant-formula
manufacturing firm owned by American Home Products) got its big breakthrough.
Wyeth owned a very small market share and would jump at such an opportunity to
expand. After Wyeth submitted bids and won contracts, it did not take long for the others
to participate. This is a classic case of the prisoner’s dilemma problem in game theory.
The prisoner’s dilemma is a situation where player can maximise their gains and optimize
their strategy by observing strategies of other players or market participants. Betson
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(2007) stresses that in the prisoner’s dilemma problem, while it is in the best interests of
all firms not to bid, each manufacturer has a huge incentive to do so if they expect other
firms to not bid.
2.2 TRENDS IN INFANT FORMULA REBATE CONTRACTS
A s the largest buyer of infant formula in the United States, the federal government
requires all WIC agencies to operate a system that reduce the cost of infant formula (Davis
& Oliviera, 2015). According to Oliviera et al. (2013) and Davis and Oliviera (2015),
usually State WIC agencies receive huge rebate discounts from the infant formula
producers for every unit of formula bought through the initiative (Davis & Oliviera,
2015). WIC contracts are awarded to the lowest net price offering manufacturer. The net
price is the difference between the wholesale price and the rebate offered. A study
conducted by the Economic Research Service based on a 2008 data identified that net
prices kept rising, raising concern that this trend could constrain the WIC program’s
ability to serve all participants. The study based on a February 2013 data allayed similar
concerns (Oliveira et al. 2013).
2.3 INFANT FORMULA PRICING
Prices of infant formula has generated contentions among various stakeholders over
the years (Davis D. , 2014). Davis (2014) mentions that beginning in the 1990s, industry
stakeholders had identified a rise in WIC participation as well as the price of infant
formula. According to the General Accounting Office (GAO, 1998), after the rebate
introduction, some industry players conjectured that the source of the huge rebates offered
by manufacturers were results of higher prices at which the formula is sold to non-WIC
participants (GAO, 1998). Oliveira et. al. (2004) revealed that the speculations in the
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1990’s led the US Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust, Monopolies, and Business Rights
to launch an inquiry into the behaviour of formula producers at the time.
2.5 REBATE SYSTEM
The WIC rebate auction system has been very profitable to states’ WIC agencies, as the
cost of procuring infant formula has declined (Davis D. , 2014). Producers are forced to
sell unlikely below or near their cost of production limiting their proﬁt gains. As such,
producers yearn to subsidize their losses with increased revenues accrued from non-WIC
participants. Davis (2014) argues that because the WIC contract brands become favourites
of both WIC participants and non-WIC participants, manufactures are motivated to
submit bids for contract regardless of whether they make losses. Davis (2014) terms this
as the “spill-over effect”. A GAO report in 1998, revealed that recommendations of WIC
brands to WIC participants by doctors to WIC mothers and the preference received by
WIC brands in terms of retail store locations and shelf space were the two potential
sources for a spill-over effect.
Infant formula accounts for over 40 percent of the total cost of WIC food in the
mid-1980s. As the cost kept rising, it became harder for state agencies to serve women,
infants, and children on program. As such many participants were placed on waiting lists
(Carlson, Greenstein, & Neuberger, 2017).
According to Carlson et. al. (2017), several state agencies adopted the competitive
free market bidding approach to manage the cost by obtaining best deals on infant formula
prices. Tennessee and Oregon were the pioneers of this initiative.
The biggest players in this industry, Mead Johnson and Ross Laboratories, resisted
the idea of a competitive bidding process. They both refrained from submitting bids when
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the first state auctions were opened. It took third and smaller producer, Wyeth, to submit
and win bids in Tennessee to save the program. The Tennessee WIC agency ended up
securing huge sums in savings. This success story drove other states to follow the
competitive bidding process (Carlson, Greenstein, & Neuberger, 2017).
2.6 REBATES AND PRICE OF INFANT FORMULA
Since the employment of rebate scheme, Oliveira, et. al. (2004) argues that the
infant formula prices has risen consistently. The scheme left a few customers who are
price sensitive to pay for formula, and producers in return charged higher retail prices.
Davis (2004) identified in a multiple regression analysis and concluded that the rising
retail prices increased as a brand wins the WIC contract and that retail prices rose with
the size of the WIC market (Davis, 2004).
In contrast with Oliveira et.al (2014), a study conducted by the Centre for Budget
Priority (CBPP) analysis of the US Department of Agriculture administration data, found
that rebate discounts may have caused a decline in the cost of the WIC menu after
controlling for inflation (Carlson, Greenstein, & Neuberger, 2017). Between 1990 and
2014, the cost of food sold to WIC participants rose half as much as the total cost of food
ie. 45 percent versus 82 percent as shown in figure 1.1 below.
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Figure 1. 1 WIC Food Cost Trend over time.
Source: (CBPP Analysis of U.S. Department of Agriculture Administration data,
2016)

Betson (2009) developed a model that captures the behaviour of firms with regards
to wholesale prices, WIC initiative and rebate auction. With the WIC initiative, because
WIC mothers become perfectly inelastic customers, firms cannot ignore their behaviour
when setting wholesale prices (Davis, 2014).
Davis (2014) further noted that one would expect WIC’s implementation to result
in wholesale prices rising in comparison to an alternative situation without the program,
but the difference in wholesale prices in both cases is unknown.
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2.7 DECISION-MAKING IN BIDDING-PROCESSES
A great volume of literature has focused on bidding strategies and bidding decision
making since Friedman (1956) introduced his mathematical model (Friedman, 1956;
Skitmore, 2002). This led to the emergence of the school of research that has focused on
mark-up decisions, and maximizing the expected profit from a tender (Parvar, Lowe,
Emsley, & Duff, 2000). Another research stream has concentrated on the bid decision
making processes (Ahmad, 1990; Paranka, 1971) and on factors that affect the bid/no bid
decisions (Dulaimi & Shan, 2002; Lowe & Parvar, 2004; Shash, 1998)
As bidding strategies or mark-up decision are not the focuses of this thesis, the
following paragraphs concentrate first on some of the studies describing the decision
making in bid processes. This is followed by a selection of studies in which the factors
that influence bid and no bid decision-making were identified.
Paranka (1971) defines the bidding strategy as including a pre-bidding analysis
stage and a bidding determination stage. According to Paranka (1971), it is crucial first
to evaluate the pay-off value of a bid opportunity before placing an actual bid.
According to Betson (2007), bids by the “big two” Mead Johnson and Ross Labs
were as high as 117 sole source contracts from 1981 through 2002. In analysing rebateswholesale price relationship, Betson (2007) acknowledges the essential consequence of a
theoretical model on which a manufactures’ rebate offers decisions are separated. If for
some reason, according to Betson (2007), the manufacturer choses to increase their
wholesale price by a dollar, rebate offers would rise by an equal dollar to keep net prices
to the government same. Betson (2007) found wholesale prices statistically significant
which confirmed his theoretical model’s result on the wholesale prices and rebates
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relationships based on the bids submitted by the “big two”- Ross and Mead Johnson
during the same period.
Betson (2007) again identified that forms of rebates offered in early solicitations
were different from following ones, and that the difference in rebate discounts submitted
by Mead Johnson and by Ross did not differ greatly.
Smaller states which are unable to secure similarly sized rebates as larger states
group themselves into alliances in hope that as the alliances grow bigger they may attract
equal rebates as larger states. The elasticities of the rebates submitted by both Mead
Johnson and Ross were inelastic in nature i.e. a ten-percentage increase in the size of the
contract yielded less than a percentage increase in the size of the rebate offered (Betson
2007) statistically lending evidence to the claim of these small states. States that formed
alliances obtained rebates that were statistically equivalent to stand alone states (Betson
2007), (Davis, 2011).
Upon further investigation of the rebates bid in subsequent solicitations, Betson
(2009) found that whoever held the current contract was a crucial element in determining
the rebates offered by either Mead Johnson or Ross. In cases where smaller firms with a
small market share (Wyeth and Carnation) held the current contract, Mead Johnson and
Ross Labs submitted bids for the contract with rebates 3.3 percent higher than what they
would have bid if one of them held the contract. Again, a 2.7 percent rebate lower than
what they would have bid is offered by the other dominant firm not holding the contract.
This behaviour according to Betson (2007) can be interpreted as a firm bidding to
maintain their contract or not caring much about a major competitor (Betson, 2007).
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2.9 WINNING BIDDERS’ MARGIN OF VICTORY
Davis and Oliviera (2015) postulated that in several instances, a winning net price
bid offer diffed immensely from that of the closest competitor. In thirteen instances, the
second lowest net price bid was twice as large as the winning bid. Davis and Oliviera
(2015) referred to this net price gap as the “margin of victory”. Margins of victory
according to Davis and Oliviera (2015) are essential as they are indicators of the auction
outcome and eventually cost of the infant formula if the closest competitor had won.
Recently, the three major infant formula manufacturers have all submitted bids for
every state or alliance WIC infant formula contracts. This means manufacturers valued
many contracts differently and this is measured by the various net prices offered (Davis
and Oliviera 2015).
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CHAPTER THREE (3)
METHODOLOGY

3.0 INTRODUCTION
This chapter presents the model for the study. It mainly consists of the methods
of study, the specification of the model, the estimation procedure and describes the
process of the data analysis.
3.1 RESEARCH METHOD
There are several alternative methods for social science research. Numerous
studies have employed panel data techniques, cross sectional and time-series methods
examining bid/no bid decisions. However, the decision to apply any of the possible
alternative methods for research depends on data, more variability and usefulness of
research, and the objective of the approach in studying the effects of predictor variables
on bid decisions.
This research employs cross-sectional time-series data on WIC from 1986 to
2016. To achieve the objectives of the study, the logistic regression econometric method
is adopted for the data estimation and analysis using Stata software package.
The data used in this research was secondary data drawn from 1986 to 2016. The
data (Davis, 2016) include baseline information about the participants so there is no need
to create a survey instrument.
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3.2 SAMPLE DESIGN
The database was described by Davis (2016) and the data were obtained from
different sources. A word of caution should be issued here as the data were gathered from
different historical sources. Efforts were made by Davis (2016) to ensure its accuracy,
however due to the minimalist information provided inaccuracies may still exist.
The database was organized in a flat file format, and each row observation
represented a US state, District of Columbia, Puerto Rico and some Indian Tribal
Organizations, and other territories were not included.
Davis (2016) acknowledges that at the time of his writing, the database captured
almost all thirteen-ounce milk-based liquid concentrate winning and losing rebate bids
from 1987 to 2016. Both soy-based and mild-based liquid concentrate bids were used as
they were available.
Many state WIC agencies form some type of alliances to jointly contract with
infant-formula manufacturers, which is included in the data as an indicator variable for
whether a state stood alone or was a member of an alliance (Davis 2016).

3.3 SOURCE OF DATA
The study used existing sources as its basis. It is also made use of secondary data
from which analysis was conducted to achieve the objective of the study. This is because
the verification process is more rapid and the reliability of information and conclusion is
greatly enhanced. The data contain several variables which were obtained from different
sources. To appropriately consider all factors that through extensive research performed
and the literature are believed to affect the bidding decisions by infant formula
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manufacturers in rebate auctions, the following was done. In the initial selection of
variables, factors that clearly demonstrated risk and decision to enter auctions were
identified.
Other sources will include the USDA’s Food and Nutrition Services (FNS). The
choice of this period was informed by the availability of data for the variables of interest.
The secondary data “was readily available and hence convenient to use’’ (Ghauri
et al, 2002). Also, it provided enough information to test the hypothesis of this study.

3.4 ESTIMATION PROCESS
The maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) was used to build the logit model to
test the listed hypothesis. This enabled me to identify those variables which significantly
impact bidding decisions. Stata software was used for data analysis.

3.5 THE MODEL
A logistic regression model below was used. Profit is one key motivation to bid
in a WIC rebate auction. The response variable is Bid which takes on binary values of
zero and one. A zero for no bid in WIC rebate auctions and one for the decision to place
a bid in WIC rebate auctions.
Logistic regression models are relatively simple but extremely powerful. Like
linear regression models, the goal is to predict a dependent or target variable using
various independent variables. The graph below compares how linear and logistic
regression fit a binary target variable.
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A Graph Comparing Logistic Vs. Linear Fit
Source: (Thomas, Edelman, & Crook, 2002)

Figure 3. 1 Comparison of Logistic and Linear Estimation
Logistic regression accounts for the horizontal asymptotes in the binary
distribution. Since the probability of an event is bounded by zero and one, logistic
regression is more appropriate because it transforms the expected value of the dependent
variable into a distribution with the correct range using the log-odds or logit function
(Thomas, Edelman, & Crook, 2002). The logit function is simply the natural log of the
odds, where the odds are the probability of an event divided by the complement of that
probability.
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3.5.1 BINARY LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODEL
Let 𝑌𝑖 represent response variable, 𝑥𝑖 represent covariates, we get:
𝑷(𝒀𝒊 = 𝟏) = 𝝅𝒊 =

𝒆𝒙𝒑(𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏 𝒙𝒊 )
𝟏 + 𝒆𝒙𝒑(𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏 𝒙𝒊 )
(1)

The 𝛽 , 𝑠 in (1) represent parameters of the linearized generalized linear form 𝛽0
representing the estimate on the average of the response variable if all other predictor
variables are constant. 𝛽1 is the estimate of the response as a result of a unit change in a
covariate holding all other variables constant.
3.5.2 MULTIPLE LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODEL
We can extend the simple logistic regression model easily to more than one predictor
variable.
Let us define,

𝛽0
𝛽
𝛽 = [ …1 ]
𝛽𝑝−1 𝑝×1

1
1
𝑥
𝑋
𝑋=[ 1 ]
𝑋𝑖 = [ …𝑖1 ]
…
𝑥𝑖,𝑝−1 𝑝×1
𝑋𝑃−1 𝑃×1

we get,
𝑿′ 𝜷 = 𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏 𝑿𝟏 + ⋯ + 𝜷𝒑−𝟏 𝑿𝒑−𝟏

(2)

𝑿𝒊 ′𝜷 = 𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏 𝒙𝒊𝟏 + ⋯ + 𝜷𝒑−𝟏 𝒙𝒊,𝒑−𝟏

(3)

So
𝑬{𝒀𝒊 } = 𝝅𝒊 =

𝒆𝒙𝒑(𝑿𝒊 ′𝜷)
𝟏 + 𝒆𝒙𝒑(𝑿𝒊 ′𝜷)
(4)
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3.5.3 MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD
Recall that the joint probability function for binary logistic regression is:
𝒀

𝒈(𝒀𝟏 , … , 𝒀𝒏 ) = ∏𝒏𝒊=𝟏 𝒇𝒊 (𝒀𝒊 ) = ∏𝒏𝒊=𝟏 𝝅𝒊 𝒊 (𝟏 − 𝝅𝒊 )𝟏−𝒀𝒊

(5)

𝒀

𝒍𝒐𝒈𝒆 𝒈(𝒀𝟏 , … , 𝒀𝒏 ) = 𝒍𝒐𝒈𝒆 ∏𝒏𝒊=𝟏 𝒇𝒊 (𝒀𝒊 ) = 𝒍𝒐𝒈𝒆 ∏𝒏𝒊=𝟏 𝝅𝒊 𝒊 (𝟏 − 𝝅𝒊 )𝟏−𝒀𝒊

(5b)

= ∑𝒏𝒊=𝟏[𝒀𝒊 𝒍𝒐𝒈𝒆 𝝅𝒊 + (𝟏 − 𝒀𝒊 )𝒍𝒐𝒈𝒆 (𝟏 − 𝝅𝒊 )]

(5c)

𝝅

= ∑𝒏𝒊=𝟏 [𝒀𝒊 𝒍𝒐𝒈𝒆 (𝟏−𝝅𝒊 )] + ∑𝒏𝒊=𝟏 𝒍𝒐𝒈𝒆 (𝟏 − 𝝅𝒊 )
𝒊

Since
𝟏 − 𝝅𝒊 =

(5d)

𝟏
𝟏 + 𝒆𝒙𝒑(𝜷𝟎+ 𝜷𝟏 𝒙𝒊)
(6)

and
𝒍𝒐𝒈𝒆 (

𝝅𝒊
) = 𝜷 𝟎 + 𝜷 𝟏 𝒙𝒊
𝟏 − 𝝅𝒊
(6b)

Therefore,
𝒍𝒐𝒈𝒆 𝑳(𝜷𝟎 , , 𝜷𝟏 ) = ∑𝒏𝒊=𝟏 𝒀𝒊 (𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏 𝒙𝒊 ) − ∑𝒏𝒊=𝟏 𝒍𝒐𝒈𝒆 [𝟏 + 𝒆𝒙𝒑(𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏 𝒙𝒊 )]
(7)
We are trying to find 𝛽0 and 𝛽1 to maximize the log-likelihood function:
𝒍𝒏 = 𝒍𝒐𝒈𝒆 𝑳(𝜷𝟎 , , 𝜷𝟏 ) = ∑𝒏𝒊=𝟏 𝒀𝒊 (𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏 𝑿𝒊 ) − ∑𝒏𝒊=𝟏 𝒍𝒐𝒈𝒆 [𝟏 + 𝐞𝐱𝐩(𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏 𝑿𝒊 )]
(8)
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Define:
𝑦1
𝑋1𝑇
𝑦2
𝑋2𝑇
𝑦
~𝑈 = [ … ] 𝑋𝑈 =
…
𝑦𝑁
[𝑋𝑁𝑇 ]
The model is

𝒀 = 𝑿𝑻 𝜷
(9)

. The estimator of 𝜷 is

−𝟏

−𝟏

𝑼

𝑼

̂ = (𝑿𝑻𝑼 ∑ 𝑿𝑼 )−𝟏 𝑿𝑻𝑼 ∑ 𝒚𝑼
𝜷
(9b)
, where ∑𝒖 𝒊𝒔 a diagonal matrix with 𝒊th diagonal element 𝝈𝟐𝒊 .
To estimate the parameters (9b) for linear regression, least squares (9)
approximation is used, and the explicit solutions for the estimates can be calculated.
In logistic regression using least squares approximation usually does not result in
an explicit solution for the estimates. Therefore, maximum likelihood estimation is
used. Maximum likelihood estimation maximizes the likelihood function. Based on
the data, the likelihood function calculates the probability that the parameters are
correct. Thus, when the likelihood function is maximized, the probability that the
parameters chosen are correct based on the modeling data is maximized (Faraway,
2006). Since the dependent variable is binary, it is a Bernoulli random variable.
The probability is evaluated by substituting the observed values of the independent
variables into the equation.
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3.6 TECHNIQUES FOR EVALUATION OF RESULTS
The estimation technique used for this research is a multivariate maximum
likelihood estimation technique; specifically, the study employs a logit model. This nature
of econometric analysis is used to determine the probability that an individual or entity
with certain characteristics belongs or does not belong to a phenomenon under study.
Logit models are binary classification models where the dependent variable is
dichotomous and takes the value 0 or 1. In this analysis, I specify the dependent variables
as 1 if firm bids in an auction (and zero otherwise). I therefore specify the logit models
for bidding decisions as follows (8), (9) and (10).

Let
𝝅𝑵𝒐 𝑩𝒊𝒅 = 𝑵𝒐 𝒃𝒊𝒅 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒇𝒊𝒕

(10)

𝝅 𝑩𝒊𝒅 = 𝒃𝒊𝒅 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒇𝒊𝒕

(10b)

𝑩𝒊𝒅 𝒊𝒇 𝝅𝑩𝒊𝒅 > 𝝅𝑵𝒐 𝑩𝒊𝒅

(10c)

The firm bids in (10) if profit made is greater than a no bidding counterpart. The reverse
occurs in (10b) below, where the firm has no incentive to bid should profit gained by
doing so falls below a no bid counterpart.
𝑵𝒐 𝑩𝒊𝒅 𝒊𝒇 𝝅𝑩𝒊𝒅 < 𝝅𝑵𝒐 𝑩𝒊𝒅

(11)

𝝅𝑩𝒊𝒅 − 𝝅𝑵𝒐 𝑩𝒊𝒅 ≥ 𝟎 → 𝑩𝒊𝒅 = 𝟏

(11b)

The response variable Bid will take on the value 1 if the difference between bid profit and
no bid profit is greater than zero (10c). If the difference is less than zero, the firm is less
likely to submit a bid in the WIC rebate contract.
𝝅𝑩𝒊𝒅 − 𝝅𝑵𝒐 𝑩𝒊𝒅 < 𝟎 → 𝑩𝒊𝒅 = 𝟎

(12)

Specifying the logistic regression model from (10c) and (11) produces (12)
𝝅𝑩𝒊𝒅 − 𝝅𝑵𝒐 𝑩𝒊𝒅 = 𝒇(𝑿′ 𝜷)

(12a)
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𝑩𝒊𝒅 = 𝑬𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒚 = 𝒇(𝑿′ 𝜷)

(13)

𝑓(𝑋 ′ 𝛽) 𝑖𝑠 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝑡𝑜 𝑏𝑒 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛, 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛

𝑷𝒓( 𝒚 = 𝟏|𝑿𝒊 ) =

𝒆𝑿𝒊 (𝜷𝟏−𝜷𝟐)
𝟏 + 𝒆𝑿𝒊(𝜷𝟏−𝜷𝟐)
(14)

1
𝑖𝑓 𝜋 𝐵𝑖𝑑 − 𝜋 𝑁𝑜 𝐵𝑖𝑑 ≥ 0 → 𝐵𝑖𝑑
𝑦= {
0 𝑖𝑓 𝜋 𝐵𝑖𝑑 − 𝜋 𝑁𝑜 𝐵𝑖𝑑 < 0 → 𝑁𝑜 𝐵𝑖𝑑
(15)
Since the predictions can be either

or

i.e. binary choice (15). I assessed the

model’s prediction power with Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve and tested
for Misspecification using the RESET Test. The estimated model takes the form;
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏( 𝐵𝑖𝑑 = 1) = 𝑓(𝛼 , 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒, 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑆𝑞𝑑, 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒, 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟, 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚)

The definitions of the variables in the model are shown below, which also offers several
comments about their specification.

3.7 VARIABLE DESCRIPTION
Bid: The response variable is a dummy variable for whether a firm bid or not. Since Bid
decisions may be influenced by several factors, it is important to control for as many of
these confounding factors as possible when analysing the bidding decisions by the firm.
Therefore, the model included several independent variables to represent economic and
WIC program factors thought to influence the bid decision of infant formula producers.
These independent variables included market share, market share squared, State Alliance,
Previous holder.
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Share: All four firms have individual share of the WIC market. The variable Share was
calculated by dividing each firm’s annual infants by annual WIC infants and multiplying
by 100.
share2: share * share.
State Alliance: Variable indicates whether a state is part of a multistate alliance or not. 1
= Yes and 0 = No
Previous Provider or Holder: This variable note whether a bidder held the state’s
contract the previous time it was up for bid.
Firm: Carnation (1), Mead Johnson (1), Ross (2), Wyeth (4) Firm dummy variable
3.8 MODEL SPECIFICATION
𝑃

Log (1−𝑃𝑖 ) = α + β1*MARKET_SHARE + β2* STATE_ALLIANCE + β4*
𝑖

PREVIOUS_PROVIDER

+

β5*

MARKET_SHARE2

+

β6*CARNATION

+

β7*MEADJOHNSON + β8*ROSS
+ε

(16)

Where, α is a constant term, βn are the coefficients to be determined, and ε is the error
term.
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CHAPTER FOUR (4)
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
4. 0 INTRODUCTION
This chapter presents and evaluates the empirical estimation of the model. The chapter
also presents the results of hypotheses tests to know what influences infant formula
manufactures’ bid decisions in the WIC Market.
4. 1 STATE-ALLIANCE
The essence of research depends largely on state – alliance features of the
population. An essential understanding of the different alliance features of the states
involved cannot be over-looked. Alliance refers to state agencies and offices that have
joined together for a mutual benefit of purposely putting up auctions for competitive WIC
bids.

Figure 4. 1 SATE-ALLIANCE SIZE DISTRIBUTION OF THE POPULATION
Source: Computed from Data (2008) using Tableau
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From the figure 4.1 above is a figure I created to understand WIC-Multi-State Alliance
memberships, it is observed that alliances change from year to year with others repeating
or switching alliances all together. The numbers on the map represent state alliances over
the years from 1987 to 2016. The colours represent the different alliances. These alliances
do not depend on the state size or geographic location. From the map, Texas and Minnesota
regardless of their land size are a part of the same alliance.

Table 4.0.1: Alliances Name and Their States Membership Over the Years

Alliance Name

Year

States

DC_DE_MD

1989

Maryland,

DC

and

Delaware
AR_NM

1991

Arkansas and New Mexico

NEW_ENG & Northwest

1991

Maine,

Connecticut,

Massachusetts,

New

Hampshire
The

Western

Contracting

States 1992
Alliance.

Alaska, Idaho, Montana,
Nevada,

(WSCA1)

Oregon,

Utah,

Washington, Wyoming

TX_IA_MN

1992

Texas, Iowa and Minnesota

IN_MI

1992

Indiana and Michigan

DC_DE_MD_VI_WV

1993

District

of

Columbia,

Delaware, and Maryland,
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Virgin Islands and West
Virginia
NE_SD

1993

Nebraska and South Dakota

TX_IA_MN1

1993

Texas, Iowa and Minnesota

States 1993

Alaska, Idaho, Montana,

The

Western

Contracting

Alliance.

Nevada,

(WSCA1)

Oregon,

Utah,

Washington, Wyoming

AR_NM_NC

1994

Arkansas, New Mexico and
North Carolina

NEATO_1

1994

Connecticut,

Maine,

Massachusetts and New
Hampshire
The

Western

Contracting

States 1995
Alliance.

Alaska, Arizona, Hawaii,
Idaho, Montana, Nevada,

(WSCA2)

Oregon, Utah, Washington,
Wyoming

TX_IA_MN1

1995

Texas, Iowa and Minnesota

NEATO_1

1996

Connecticut,

Maine,

Massachusetts and New
Hampshire
NE_SD

1996

Nebraska and South Dakota

IN_MI

1996

Indiana and Michigan
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AR_NM_NC

1997

Arkansas, New Mexico and
North Carolina

Mid-Atlantic

1997

Maryland, Delaware, DC

TX_IA_MN2

1998

Texas, Iowa and Minnesota

States 1998

Alaska, Arizona, Hawaii,

The

Western

Contracting

Alliance.

Idaho, Montana, Nevada,

(WSCA2)

Oregon, Utah, Washington,
Wyoming

NE_SD_CHRV

1999

Nebraska, South Dakota
and Cheyenne River Indian
Reservation

SW_Region(South

West 1999

Oklahoma

Region)
Mid Atlantic

1999

Maryland, Delaware, DC

NEATO_1

1999

Connecticut,

Maine,

Massachusetts and New
Hampshire
AR_NM_NC

2000

Arkansas, New Mexico and
North Carolina

NEATO_1

2001

Connecticut,

Maine,

Massachusetts and New
Hampshire
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The

Western

Contracting

States 2001
Alliance.

Alaska, Arizona, Delaware,
Hawaii,

(WSCA3)

Idaho,

Maryland,

Kansas,
Montana,

Nevada,

Oregon,

Washington,

Utah,

DC

and

Wyoming
NE_SD_CHRV

2002

Nebraska, South Dakota
and Cheyenne River Indian
Reservation

TX_IA_MN2

2002

Texas, Iowa and Minnesota

NE_SD_MO

2003

Nebraska, South Dakota
and Missouri

AR_NM_NC

2003

Arkansas, New Mexico and
North Carolina

SW_Region(South

West 2003

Oklahoma

Region)
NEATO_1

2004

Connecticut,

Maine,

Massachusetts and New
Hampshire
WSCA3

2004

Alaska, Arizona, Deleware,
Hawaii,
Maryland,
Nevada,

Idaho,

Kansas,
Montana,

Oregon,

Utah,
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Washington,

DC

and

Wyoming
SW_Region(South

West 2005

Oklahoma

Region)
TX_IA_MN2

2005

Texas, Iowa and Minnesota

AR_NM_NC

2006

Arkansas, New Mexico and
North Carolina

NEATO_1

2006

Connecticut,

Maine,

Massachusetts and New
Hampshire
The

Western

Contracting

States 2007
Alliance.

Alaska, Arizona, Delaware,
Hawaii,

(WSCA4)

Idaho,

Maryland,
Nevada,

Kansas,
Montana,

Oregon,

Utah,

Washington, Wyoming
TX_IA_MN2

2007

Texas, Iowa and Minnesota

SW_Region

2008

Oklahoma

AR_NM_NC

2009

Arkansas, New Mexico and
North Carolina

NE_SD_MO

2009

Nebraska, South Dakota
and Missouri
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NEATO_2

2011

Connecticut,

Maine,

Massachusetts and New
Hampshire
Source: Computed from Data (2016) using Tableau.
4.2 FIRMS
From Table 4.1, it is observed that 32 percent of total sample size in the data are
Mead Johnson and Ross respectively, and 24 percent of sample size is Carnation and
Wyeth with 13 percent. The observations in the table represent the total number of bids
the firms considered- both ones they submitted bids and ones they didn’t; a combination
of bid and no bid auctions for each firm from 1987 to 2016.
Table 4. 1 Summary Statistics of Firm Bids
Firm

Counts

Percent

Carnation

283

24.00

Mead Johnson

372

31.55

Ross

372

31.55

Wyeth

152

12.89

Total

1179

100

Source: Computed from Data (2016) STATA
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4. 3 FIRMS AND THEIR AUCTION COUNTS
From Table 4.2, it is observed that, Mead Johnson has a total of 144 wins i.e. 46% of
auctions. Ross follows in second place with a total of 35% auction wins. Carnation has won
15% of total auction and Wyeth with a total of 5% auction wins.
Table 4.2 Summary of Auction Winning Firms
Firm

Frequency

Percent

Carnation

46

14.56

Mead Johnson

144

45.57

Ross

109

34.49

Wyeth

17

5.38

Total

316

100

Source: Computed from Data (2016) STATA

4. 4 FIRM WIC CONTRACT WINS AND THEIR SHARE OF INFANTS
The Figure 4.3 shows contract winning firm and their share of all WIC infants on
the average. The figure shows that Carnation has an average of 40% of all WIC infants.
Mead John has the highest of 48% of all WIC infants, Ross follows with 40.3%. Wyeth
has the least WIC alliance share of infants of 18%. This can be seen in the figure 4.3.
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Figure 4.3: Firms and Average Share of WIC Market Over The Years.
Source: Computed from Data (2016) STATA

4.5 FIRMS AVERAGE WIC INFANTS UNDER CONTRACTS
In Figure 4.3 below it is observed that a total of 34,717 infants average were under contract
to Carnation and 40,321 total infants were under contract to Ross and Mead Johnson had a
total of 46,455 under contracts as shown below in Figure 4.3
Table 4. 3 Cross Tabulation of Firms and WIC Infants
Firm

Mean

Standard Deviation.

Freq.

Carnation

34716.691

28941.456

24

Mead Johnson

46455.338

65453.943

84

Ross

40321.373

45898.553

71

Wyeth

25996.923

14194.142

13

Total

41334.513

52732.906

192

Source: Computed from Data (2016) STATA

40

Figure 4. 4 Firms WIC Infants Over the Years
Source: Computed from Data (2016) STATA

4. 5 BIDS WON BY FIRMS VERSUS NON-WINNING BIDS
Table 4. 4 Cross Tabulation of Bid Firms Won Against Non–Winning Bids
Bid

Total

Firm

0

1

Carnation

149

134

283

Mead Johnson

26

346

372

Ross

20

352

372

Wyeth

49

103

152

Total

244

935

1179

Source: Computed from Data (2016) STATA
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From Table 4.4 above, it is observed that Carnation had a total of 283 auctions from 1987
to 2006 in which to bid, with 149 no bids and 134 bids. Mead Johnson bids in 346 out of
372 total auctions. Ross bids 352 out of 372 auctions. Wyeth bids 103 out of 152 total
auctions. This is clearly observed in the chart below. Wyeth, Ross and Carnation all have
85% probability of bidding and winning. Mead Johnson has about 90% probability of
bidding.

Figure 4. 5 Bid Distribution For Each Firms.
Source: Computed from Data (2016) using Stata
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4. 6 STATE ALLIANCES AND THEIR BIDS BY COUNTS
Table 4. 5 Cross Tabulation of State Alliances and Number of Bids Received By
States.
Bid
State Alliance

0

1

Total

0

173

618

791

1

71

317

388

Total

244

935

1,179

Source: Computed from Data (2016) using STATA
From Table 4.5, it is observed that States who are not in any alliances receive 618 out of
935 bids compared to states in alliances. It is also observed that Non-Alliance states
receive more bids than alliance states.
4. 7 FIRMS AND THEIR BIDDING TREND OVER TIME

Figure 4. 6 Trend of Firms Annual bid distribution over Time
Source: Computed from Data (2016) using Tableau
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The figure 4.6 above shows the number of bids annually by each of the firms. In 2012, it
is observed that, Carnation, Mead Johnson, and Ross all places a total of 25 bids in various
states. Mead Johnson and Ross may have increased their bid submissions to respond to
the market competition from Carnation. This indicates that the number of auctions varies
from year to year.
4. 8 .1 FIRMS AND THEIR AVERAGE SHARE DISTRIBUTION

Figure 4. 7 Firm and Their Average Annual WIC Share distribution over Time
Source: Computed from Data (2016) using Tableau
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The figure 4.7 shows the average share of each firm over the years. Mead Johnson has
the largest share in 2015 with an average share 42.5 percent followed by Carnation with
an average of 37 percent and Ross with 20.6% of market share.
4. 8. 2 STATES AND THEIR BID COUNTS

Figure 4. 8 States and their Bid counts distribution over the years.
Source: Computed from Data (2016) using Tableau
The chart above in figure 4.8 shows the states and the number of bids they record over
the years under consideration. The highest recorded is New Mexico with 34 bids.
Delaware, DC and Illinois received the lowest of 15 bids each.
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Table 4. 6 A summary Table (for all variables in the model)

VARIABLES

(1)
N

(2)
mean

(3)
Standard
Deviation

(4)
minimum

(5)
maximum

Bid

372

0.9301

0.2553

0

1

Share

372

38.9565

18.8209

0

78.2282

Share Squared

372

1870.886

1501.657

0

6119.66

State Alliance

372

.3252

.4691

0

1

Source: Computed from Data (2016) using STATA
The summary statistics above in Table 4.6 shows that, there are a maximum of 317,808
a minimum of 17,860 and a mean of 37,283 total WIC infants’ participants from 1972 to
2016. There is a maximum of 78% and a mean of 38% market share among all four firms.

4. 9.

REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF FACTORS INFLUENCING INFANT

FORMULA MANUFACTURERS BID OR NO BID DECISIONS.
The focus of this study is to find the relationship between factors that affected
bidding decisions of infant formula manufactures in WIC rebate auctions. In this section,
the study presents the main findings from the logistic regression analysis and the logit
model. Bidding decisions are hypothesized to be dependent on Market share, state
alliance membership and Previous Contract holder. The results of the estimations
conducted in this study are presented in Table 4.7 below.
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At a one percent significant level, the result shows that a state in some alliances increases
the probability of bidding. The odds of receiving a bid for an alliance state is 80% more
likely than a non-alliance state.

At one percent significance level, the result showed that for a unit increase in Market
Shares we expect to see about 11% increase in the odds of submitting a bid holding all
other variables constant. This implies that the greater the WIC market share, the higher
the chances of bidding. The odds ratio measures the relationship between events and their
occurrences. The odds represent the chances of an event outcome in the face of a
circumstance or exposure in comparison to the same occurring outcome in the absence of
the circumstance. In this study, the odds ratio captures a firm’s decision to bid in auction
given other variables. My decision to make use of the odds ratio instead of the logit
coefficient stems from the fact that, the logit coefficient will need to be exponentially
transformed to mean anything. The odds ratio makes interpretation easier. The variables
share and share2 were used as proxy for manufacturing capacity. As observed, an increase
in the Share2 decreases the odds of bidding by 9%. The intuition behind this decrease is
that, firms will only bid as much as their productive capacity could take beyond which
their production and gains begins to decline as such the probability of bidding will
decline.

At one percent, significant level the result shows that Previous Contract holder has no
significant effect on bidding decisions. This could because a previous holder of the
contract does not affect the prices of infant formula in an auction year.
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The results for the firms had a positive relationship with bidding decision with regards to
the base firm Wyeth. Holding all other factors constant, Mead Johnson has higher odds
of bidding by 2.9 times more than Wyeth. Ross odds of submitting a bid is 2.1 times more
than Wyeth and Carnation’s odds of bidding is 0.3 times more likely than Wyeth. These
are also shown in table 4.7.

Table 4. 7. LOGISTIC REGRESSION OUTPUT OF ALL VARIABLES.

VARIABLES

(1)
Logit coefficients

(2)
Odds ratio

0.589**
(0.268)
0.0967***
(0.0214)
-0.000837**
(0.000379)
0.104
(0.0758)
-1.165***
(0.277)
0.720**
(0.356)
1.046***
(0.371)
-0.686*
(0.406)

1.802**
(0.482)
1.101***
(0.0236)
0.999**
(0.000379)
1.110
(0.0841)
0.312***
(0.0864)
2.054**
(0.732)
2.846***
(1.055)
0.503*
(0.204)

Bid
State Alliance
Share
share2
Previous Holder
1.Carnation
2.Mead Johnson
3.Ross
Constant

Observations
756
756
Standard errors in parentheses
NOTE: All standard Errors are robust
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: Computed from Data (2016) using STATA
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𝑃

Log (1−𝑃𝑖 ) = α + 1.10 (MARKET_SHARE) + 1.802*(STATE_ALLIANCE) + 1.110*
𝑖

(PREVIOUS_PROVIDER) + 0.999*(MARKET_SHARE2) +0.31*CARNATION
2.1*MEADJOHNSON + 2.8*ROSS (1)

+

Table 4.8 Marginal Effects of Explanatory Variables On Bid

VARIABLES
State Alliance
Share
Share2
Previous Holder
Carnation
Mead Johnson
Ross
Wyeth

(1)
Marginal Effects.
0.0682*
(0.22)
0.0112***
(4.83)
-0.000968***
(-2.26)
0.0121
(1.38)
-0.204***
(-4.28)
0.0856*
(2.02)
0.114**
(2.02)
0
(.)

Observations
756
t statistics in parentheses
*** p<0.05, ** p<0.01, * p<0.5
Source: Computed from Data (2016) using STATA

4. 9.1 PROBABILITIES OF FIRMS SUBMITTING BIDS.
The marginal effects above show that the change in probability for each relative bid
relative to the base firm-Wyeth, Carnation is 20% more likely to bid than Wyeth, all other
factors held constant. Ross is 11% more likely to bid than Wyeth, all other factors held
constant. Mead Johnson is 8% more likely to bid, that Wyeth, all other factors held
constant.
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4. 9. 2 HYPOTHESES TESTING OF THE COEFFICIENTS OF BID
𝐻0 : There is no relationship between firm’s market share and bid decision.
From the test conducted in the logit model, we reject the null hypothesis at a one per cent
significance level. Thus, the coefficient of market share is statistically different from zero
in the model. Hence, we conclude that market share has a significant influence on the bid
decisions in WIC rebate auctions.
PREDICTED PROBABILITY OF BID

Figure 5.0 WIC Share and The Probability of Firms Submitting Bids
Source: Computed from Data (2016) using STATA
Figure 5.0 The Figure 5.0 above shows that the probability of bidding at various market
shares. The probability of bidding peaks at about 60% market share. Beyond 60%, the
probability of bidding decreases. The decline in bid probability might be attributed to
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productive capacity being reached. As such, the firms are unable to meet the demand
associated with extra bids and thus are less likely to bid.
𝐻0 : There is no relationship between state alliances and bid decisions.
From the test conducted in the logit model, we reject the null hypothesis at a one per cent
significance level. Thus, the coefficient of State alliance is statistically different from zero
in the model. Hence, we conclude that State Alliance statistically has a significant
influence on bid decisions in WIC rebate auctions. Being in a State alliance increases bids
submitted by 60% more than if they are unaligned, holding all other factors constant and
as such, bids increases with the alliances size. Dana (2012) identified it is not the size

of buyers but the differences in buyers’ characteristics that influences the bargaining
power of alliances.
4. 9. 3 RESULTS FOR MODEL MISSPECIFICATION
The logit model was tested for misspecification with a RESET statistic. If the model really
is specified correctly, should I regress Bid on the prediction and the prediction squared,
the prediction squared should have no explanatory power. This is observed as the
prediction squared returned an insignificant p-value.
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Table 4.9 RESET Test
(1)
VARIABLES

Bid

Bid_Predicted

.9454552***
(.1462865)

Bid_PredictedSquared

.0248621
(0.44)

Constant

-0.014527
(0.1306236)

Observations

756

Source: Computed from Data (2016) using STATA
4. 9. 4 RESULTS FOR ROC (Receiver Operating Characteristic) Curve

The Receiver Operating Characteristic Curve is a standard technique for summarizing the
performance over some range of trade-offs between true positives (TP) and false positive
(FP) error rates (Sweets, 1988). It plots the sensitivity (the ability of the model to predict
and event correctly) versus specificity (a model’s ability to predict wrongly).

The ROC curve is a graph that captures of specificity against sensitivity. According to
Archer, K. J., and S. Lemeshow (2006) this is guaranteed to be a monotone non-decreasing
function because the number of correctly predicted successes increases and the number of
correctly predicted failures decreases as the classification cut-off decreases.
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The area under the ROC curve is determined by integrating the curve. The vertices of the
curve are determined by sorting the data according to the predicted index, and the integral
is computed using the trapezoidal rule (Archer, K. J., & S. Lemeshow 2006). The area
under the curve of approximately 0.8 indicates acceptable discrimination for the model.
The area under the curve indicates predictive power of the model as shown in figure 5.1
below.

Figure 5.1 The ROC (Receiver Operating Characteristic) Curve
Source: Computed from Data (2016) using STATA
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CHAPTER FIVE (5)
SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

5. 0 INTRODUCTION
This chapter presents a summary of key findings of the study on bidding decisions in
WIC rebate auctions. This is followed by the conclusions from the study and the possible
recommendations for policymakers and future research.
5. 1 SUMMARY
This study examined the factors influencing bidding decisions by infant formula
manufacturers in WIC rebate auctions. A logit model was used to estimate the model.
The study showed that the market share size of all firms influenced bidding
decisions of these firms.
To achieve the specific objectives of the study, the stated hypotheses were tested;
bid was regressed on market share and market shared squared holding other factors as
other control variables. The independent variables showed that market share increases the
probability of bidding among infant formula manufacturers up to about 60% market
share. The hypothesis test shows that the coefficients of share is statistically different
from zero. The study revealed the manufacturing firm will bid up to the point optimal
capacity, beyond which their bid probability declines.
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5. 2 CONCLUSIONS
Market Share is revealed to have a positive effect on the bidding decision among
Infant formula manufacturers in US. Thus, an increase in market share increases the
probability of firms bid for WIC contracts. Carefully analysing the results of the effect of
market share on firms bidding decisions in the US, it was found that an increase in market
share increases the probability of firms bidding until a firm reaches about 60% market
share holding all other factors constant.
Further, the study showed that alliances membership of state affects the bids they
receive. Some states size and previous contract holder may not be significant
determinants of bidding decisions in infant formula manufacturing market.

5. 3 RECOMMENDATIONS
Based on the findings and conclusions of this study, the following
recommendations can be deduced:
From the study, market share is essential to firms submitting bids for infant formula as a
such efforts should be made by the federal government through policies to encourage the
entry of more firms in the WIC market breaking the oligopoly that currently exits and
reduce the market share held by the existing firms. The federal government has a role to
play enacting policies towards enticing other firms into the industry.
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5. 4 RESEARCH LIMITATION
•

Every research has some limitations. The first limitation associated with this study was
data availability.

•

Another limitation was that some variables that would have also made meaningful
explanations to the model may be ignored. Variables such as contract length and contract
type could have explained the model but were ignored. This is because of inconsistency
of results and time constraints.
5. 5 SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY
Based the limitations of this study, the following suggestions are made for future studies:

a. Researchers can consider using dataset that has income and other demographics of WIC
participant measured as a continuous variable.
b. Researchers should also consider other variables including supply-side variables in
estimating their bid model.
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APPENDIX
Table 4. 2 CORRELATION MATRIX

VARIABLES

(1)
Bid

(2)
State
Alliance

(6)
share

(7)
Share2

Bid
1.000
State Alliance
0.0414
1.000
share
0.3997
0.1009
1.000
Share2
0.3127
0.0814
0.9523
1.000
Previous Holder
0.0175
-0.1184
-0.0653
-0.0440
Firm
0.2400
-0.0909
0.0324
-0.0200
Source: Computed from Data (2008) using STATA

(8)
Previous
Holder

1.000
0.0809

(9)
Firm

1.000
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Figure 4. 2 Predictive Margins

Source: Computed from Data (2008) using STATA

